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We Need More Evidence:
Application Flaws of the Uniform Child Custody
and jurisdiction Enforcement Act in California
Elizabeth Breinholt*

V1hiw the Uniform Child Custot(y tmd jurisdiction cnforcemmt Act has gone a
long Wt1;Y in protecting the righu ofthe thild in mstody disputes, it is still lacking in .fi11ding the best jurisdittional state in terms of access 10 evidence, which
woulc/ enable a more fair decision and tlms serz,e the best interest ofthe chile!.

T

he only way to determine children's best interests in custody d isputes
within the United States' logically based legal system is with evidence.
Judges, simply seated, are assessors of evidence. They hear arguments based
on and presented with evidence. They weigh evidence for the arguments
and determine the balance. The presentation of available evidence co the
judge determ ines the ou tcome of all court cases. Wi thout avai lable and reliable evidence, judges cannot correctly and consistently determine truth.
This is why jurisdiction is rhe first issue addressed in all court cases.
Ju risdiction is the p reliminary question of authority and evidence. After determining that presiding authority can adjudicate claims, courts assess the
proper geographical location for hearing the d isputes according to the place
where evidence is most adequately available. It is in the best interest of courrs
and parries to resolve court matters in geographical locations where the optimum evidence is fou nd. Evidence yields accuracy, fortifies truth, and indicates best interests. Accordingly, ju risdiction based on proper authority and
reasonable evidence provides for the best interest of child ren involved in
child custody dispu tes. Evidence is crucial to the p rinciple of the best interest of the child. Upholding the best interest of the child is the paramount
consideration in all child custody cases.

• Eli1.abcrh Brcinholr is a senior ar Brigham Young University. She is majoring in marriage fumily & human dcvdopmeiH. Afrcr she graduares from BYU. Elizabeth
plans to attend law school. where she would like ro swdy f.1mily law.
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T he Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (hereinafter referred ro as UCCJEA) is the law used by judges in every stare in rhc
United Stares of America to determine proper jurisdiction of child cusrody
cases. The act is founded on good principles and generally upholds the best
interest of children. However, at least as applied in California, sections of the
act do nor always uphold the best interest of children. The conglomeration of
the sections of the act-specifically the exclusive and continuing jurisdiction
clause-show an un just imbalance of the two general principles of the act:
stabi li ty and evidence. T he UCCJEA minimizes evidence by overemphasizing
stability and continuity for children through the duration of child custody disputes. T his is readily seen with the exclusive and continuing section of the ac(
as applied to current child custody proceedings. The UCCJEA should be revised ro explicitly reguire jurisdictions that provide rhe best evidence. Consider
the following scenario.
II. Court Case:

Forty-two-year-old Benjamin Holbrook is an elementary school reacher
and the sole custodian of his fourteen-year-old son, Tyler, who was born in
Californ ia. 1 In 1998, after a Californ ia decree of divorce fi nalized, father and
son moved to Utah. O ne year later, Tyler's mother moved to Utah. The entire
fam ily lived in Utah for the next six years. In March of 2005, Tyler's mother
returned ro California due ro significant and terminal health problems.
On May 2 1, 2005, a police officer knocked on rhe Holbrook's front
door and informed Benjamin of Tyler's recent illegal, underage, and lifethreatening behaviors. At the end of the school year, Benjamin sent Tyler to
his aunt (a real estate agent) and uncle (a specialized doctor) in California ro
remove him temporarily from bad influences and to allow him additional
time with his termi nally ill mother. (H is mother's illness rendered her incapable of caring for her son. However, Tyler typically visited these relatives for
a couple of weeks each year and was comfortable with the arrangement.)
Upon Tyler's arrival in California, the relatives reguested that Benjamin
sign a temporary guardianship order, for the next nvo-and-a-half months of
summer, to enable them to provide fundamental supporr for Tyler (i.e.,
medical care). Benjamin reluctantly faxed his permission for temporary
guardianship in the fo rm of a short handwritten nore. Benjamin did nor sign
' To maintai n confidentiality some names have hccn changed.
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the official guardianship form and only sent the handwritten note because
he understood that any order would be temporary.
Two weeks after Benjamin faxed his nore of perm ission, on June 28,
2005, the relatives filed an action in probate court alleging Benjamin as abusive and detrimental ro his son. The pleadings stated claims of physical abuse
and emotional abuse and indicated that Tyler wanted ro remain in California
with his relatives. The relatives alleged that Benjamin washed Tyler's mouth
out with soap, yelled at his son, and slapped him on the face. The pleadings
seated that the relatives heard Benjamin yell at Tyler (prior to Benjamin's sending Tyler to California) during a telephone conversation, that there was supposedly one police report in Utah of domestic violence,! and that Benjamin is
imbalanced and makes poor decisions. It should be noted that the pleadings
did not include or allege that the father's physical discipline caused bruising,
that physical discipline was exercised on a regular basis, or clarifY the extent of
or frequency of emotional abuse.
Four months after the relatives filed their fi rst pleading, a superior court
judge heard jurisdiction arguments and, according to the UCC]EA, ruled
that California had and would exercise jurisdiction. The judge renewed the
expired temporary order to retai n Tyler in California with his aunt and uncle
for rhe duration of the dispute.
Of the many questions that could be discussed regarding this scenario, subject matter jurisdiction is critical. Should California or Urah have had subject
matter jurisdiction? The answer ro this question could have significantly altered the outcome of the dispute. All states interpret law according to their
own understanding and case law precedent. The t1Ct that Benjamin voluntarily
gave permission for temporary guardianship is highly significant in California:'
' The police repon referred to by rhe aunr and uncle was acwally a loud verbal argumem berween "Jyler and Benjamin's presem wife. A neighbor called the police.
' See G'uardiamhip ofKns.<nndm H., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1228 ( 1998); see also Guardiamhip of
Simpson, 67 Cal. App. 4rh 914 ( 1991!) (rwo monumcmal cas(-s fc:>r C1lifornia probate
determinations are G'u,rrdiamhip ofKnssf/ndm and Gumditmsbip o/Simpson. In these
two 1998 cases rhe C1lifornia Coun of Appeals shifts rhe burden of proof to the par-

ems seeking custod)'• includes an evaltwrion of moral fitness, examines the flmcss of
dw guardians. and looks ar rhc relationships between the child and parent and the
child and guardian. ·n1is criterion differs from orher rypes of cuswdy and guardianship cases; The Jiffcrcnct' -thc fathers volumarily signed the tempomry orders).
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Due to the Holbrooks' prior residency in California, the current
California divorce decree (including an initial cusmdy ruling) and the currenr
probate fili ngs in California (including the temporary guardim1ship order), rhe
Superior Court in California had jurisdiction to hear argumenrs to determine
whether to retain jurisdiction or concede jurisdiction ro Utah upon findi ng
that Utah is a more appropriate forum. California properly heard jurisdiction
argurnenrs. However. because of the UCCJ EA's improper standard of evidence, the court decision to retain jurisdiction in California was incorrect,
unfai r, and overlooked the best interest of Tyler. The bulk of the evidence
and most pertinent evidence concerning rhe leg;ll questions were in Urah.
It may be reasonable based on significanr connections ro the srare of
California, some evidence in California, or because of an emergency tO argue
for California to retai n jurisdiction. California is nor completely lacking in
these areas. Regardless of whether or not California had proper jurisdiction ,
it should nor have exercised ir because ir was not in the best interest of rhe
child. T his is where both the Superior Court and the UCCJEA failed. The
judge used the UCCJEA as legally required fo r all child custody determinations in Californ ia:' Nevertheless, rhe UCCJEA f1 iled to protect the besr
interest of Tyler. Utah was a much more appropriate forum because of rhe
availability of evidence.
The purpose of this article is to discuss rhe Holbrook jurisdictional ruling, which occurred near rhe end of 2005. Facts of rhe case and application
of jurisdictional law expose a detrimental problem with both the writing of
the UCCJEA and the interpretation thereof. Benjamin was unable to pursue
an appeal for financial reasons. This situation should be addressed co prevent
other fami lies from experiencing similar misguided and ultimately wrongful
court actions.
T he remainder of this article is as follows: Part II I mentions hiscorical
background, the purpose of the UCCJEA, and the UCCjEA as a revised
continuation of the Uniform Ch ild Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter
UCCJA). Parr IV briefly outlines and interprets key sections and F.tctors of
• GmiJ,znt v. Superior C01m oJCnl, ern/., 92 S. C t. 1265 (2005 Cal. App. 2005) (the
UCCJrA, as was rh e VCCJA pri or ro rhc UC:CJE.A passage, is superior w any and
all other legal guidelines when d eterminin g jurisdicrional dispmcs regarding child
cusrody).
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the :lCt, specifically addressing initial jurisdiction, exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction, and emergency jurisdiction. Part Vis application of the UCCJEA
to the scenario of Benjamin Holbrook. Part VI provides possible solutions ro
a flaw in rhe UCCJEA's exclusive and continuing jurisdiction section. Part
V Ill concludes the discussion of the UCCJ EA.

Ill. History & Purpose of Act:
The UCCJEA is a revised conrinuarion of the UCCJA. lr is importanr
to know the legal situation prior to the UCCJA as well as how circumstances
changed through rhe UCCJA's thi rty-year life in order to u nderstand the
purposes of rhe UCCJEA. The laws began to change shortly befo re 1968.
Patricia M . Hoff says, " Parents had a legal incen tive to abduct chi ld ren.">
T he laws benel-lred those who performed unethical actions. Stare laws on ly
required physical presence in their state ro acquire jurisd iction. Parenrs could
uproot their children, take a road tri p ro the state of choice-one that had
favorable interpretations o f child custody law that coincided with the parent's p resent situation- adjudicate custody, and return to rhe home state
when proceedings ended. T he parent with the children held the power.
The 1960s revealed many selfish parenrs. Parems overlooked the best
inrerest of their children by using these unfair tactics. C hildren lost stability. States had little, if any, eviden ce to make accurate, consistenr, good
custody decisions. Courts and lawm akers noticed the problem. Physical
presence in a stare no longer seemed the best requirement for child custody
actions. The National Conference of Commissioners o n Uniform Stare
Laws (hereafter NCCUSL) passed the UCCJA in 1968. Child custody
jurisdiction regulations improved for chi ld ren.
The UCCJA swung the pendulum from rhe state requirernenr of merely
physical presence in state to proof of the child's significant connection to the
stare. Lawmakers' main motivation fo r this act was to mai n tai n stability for
child ren unfo rtunate enough to experience custody disputes. T hey also desired an act ro create some u niform ity between states. A majority of states
have enacted the UCCJA.1'
' P:\tricin M. lloff: U.S. Dept. of)ust.. Office of justice Programs. O mcc of Juvenile
Justice anJ Delinquency Prcvenrion, 2001 Ju ve ni le Hulletin 200 I, 2 (200 I).
"C unnar J. c;itlin, jurisdictionnllssu~s in Cmtody (Visitlltion) Cttsl'.r: 1'hl' PKPAIU(X}A
1111d UC(.JF.A, ar n. 7 (2005), lmp: //www.gitlinlawllrm.com/wri tin gs/ uccja2.1nm.
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Though the act improved the issue of custody jurisd iction, some problems
remained and other problems arose during the li fe of rhe act. The UCCJA did
not (I) address matters of dual jurisdiction, (2) prevent judges in different
states from issuing decisions on the same custody case, or (3) provide guidelines for enforcement of court rulings across stares. lr also did not (4) deal with
modifications to custody in situations where parents and children moved to
other stares, (5) require every srare ro enact the act exacrly as written or in
conformity to other srates, and (6) it did nor specify that emergency jurisdiction was only temporary.- Lawmakers tried ro cope with these unforeseen problems by passing other laws and acts (like the PKPA, VAWA, those determined
at The Hague Convention, and ICARA).• But rhe laws and acts conflicted with
each other and the UCCJA. In the case of In re Marriage of Newsome,'' the
Court of Appeals judge states frustration with the UCCJA and expresses a need
ro adopt a new jurisdictional act to address certain problems.
The utility of a new uniform act is evident in light of the varying interpretations the courts have given the UCCJA in light of the J>KPA. In the
case of In re Mrmitfge ofMurphy the coun stated: "The PKPA is a full f:1ith
and credit statute. The PKPA applies only to the en forcement or modifi cation of an existing custody decree or when a custody action is already
pending in another state. If a custody decree does not alre<1dy exist, or there
is no custody action pending in another state, rhe federa l act has no application."111 Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals of Washi ngton in In
re Mtlrriage ofMurphy, the Court of Appeals in North Carolina in Potter v.
Potter" reasoned that even though the UCCJA is a jurisdictional statute and
rhe PKPA a full-faith and credit stature, to ignore the PKPA and ro be concerned only with the law of rhe forum in the absence of a pending fo reign
action is an unsatisfactory resolution. "[T]o allow custody decisions based
upon significant connection jurisdiction without regard to the PKPA would

HoA: Juvenile Bulletin 200 I, at 2.

' !d. (abbreviations stand for: r ed era l Parcnt;ll Kidnapping Prcvcnrion Act. Viole nce:
against Womcn Act, the Hague Conventio n on rhc Civil Aspects of lnn:rnarional
Child Abduction. rhc lnrcrnarional Child Abduction Rcm cJi cs Act).

'' !11 re Marrit~gt• o[Nelt'some, 68 Cal. App. 4th 949 ( I 991!).
'" In re Mt~rritlge ofMurpf~y, 90 Wn. App. 488, II ( 1998).
" Potterv. Potll'r, 131 N.C. App. I (1997).
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essentia'lly render such decrees meaningless in any stare bur our own." 1!The
Vermont Supreme Court in Columb v. Columb, 161 Vt. 103 (1993), stated,
"The theoretical possibility that a home srare would recognize a Vermont
custody order issued without the full faith and credit protection of the PKPA
is overwhelmed by the reality that courts have too often failed to respect
other srates' custody decrees even when issued in conformity with the
UCCJA and PKPA." 1J
Twenry-nine years after its passage, NCCVSL, revising the UCCJA,
blended aspects of other laws and passed the UCCJEA in 1997. The revisions
include details and guidelines for dual state jurisdiction, domestic violence
victims, custody modifications, and interstate jurisdiction enforcement.
California adopted the act rwo years later. At present, most stares in the U.S.
use the UCCJEA. Specific benefits of the UCCJEA include better balance between home stare jurisdiction and significant connections ro states, faster case
processing, better enforceability of any existing custody orders, smoother procedure for changing visitation schedules or rights, ere.
Though lawmakers removed the explicit written purpose of the act, after
revisions of the VCCJA, 11 the purpose of the UCCJA and UCCJEA are considered similar, if not the same. 1'
The Uniform Acr ... was promulgated for the stmed purposes of avoiding jurisdictional competit ion and conflict, promoting interstate cooperation, litigating custody where child and f.1mily have closest connections, discouraging
continuing conflict over cuswdy, deterring abductions and unilateral removals
of children, avoiding relitigarion of another srarc's cusrody decisions, and promoting exchange of inform atio n and o rhe r murual assistance between comts of
sister stares."·

The UCCJEA appears to meet all of the criteria, a significant accomplishment. Chi ld custody battles over ju risdiction are more straightforward
rha n they were with the details and guidelines of the old act. A highlight of

'' f>otw; N.C. App. at 15.

"Newsome, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 958 n. 4 (1998).
' ' CaL Fam. Code §3401 (2000).
'' Hoft: Juve nile. Bulledn 200 I, at 14.
,.. Kumar 11. Superior CourT, 32 Cal. 3d 689. 695 (1982).
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the UCCJEA is irs reconciliation of presence in a state (the dominant factor prior the UCCJA passage) and sign ificant connections to states (the
dominant factor with the UCCJA). Both are important hlCtors for consideration, b ur must be balanced. Focus on one without consid eration of the
ocher can lead ro u n fairness , injustice, and trampling on the best interest of
the child.
The UCCJA and UCCJEA are sim ilar in purpose and case law interpretation. Current California case law, now bound by the UCCJEA, cites
the child custody jurisdiction in terpretatio n of cases adjud icated u nder the
UCCJA (includi ng In re Stephanie M Kumar tJ. Superior Cozm, and Plas v.
Superior Court). This indicates that the UCCJ EA is considered a revised continuation o f the UCCJA in case law.
T hough the change from the UCCJA to the UCC]EA brings many improvements, some concerns about the UCCJEA exist. Although some jurisdiction decisions are easier, there is a question of whether the provisions of
the ace really uphold the best interest of the child . The Holbrook case throws
doubt on the prin ciples behind rhe exclusive and continuing jurisdiction section of the act. This section may allow stares to retain jurisdiction after an
initial jurisdiction decision, permanently, when it is nor in rhe best interest
of the child co do so. T hat is, this section may allow a state to retain jurisdiction when the state no longer has sufficient evidence. Sufficienr and necessary evidence is the only way, in our logically based legal sysrem, that
judges can correctly and accurately determine and uphold the best interest
of the child. The test of this concern is evidence.

IV. Key Sections & Factors of The lJCCJEA:
The most pertinent sections of the UCCJEA co this discussion of the

Holbrook case are inirial jurisdiction, emergency jurisdiction, and exclusive
and conrinuing jurisdiction. Basic principles and provisions of these three
sections are outlined below. This is not meant ro be a complete analysis of
rhese sections of the act, bur highlight specific derails relevant ro the
Holbrook case.
The UCCJEA has been in force in California for about ftve years. T here
is limited published case law interpreting rhe new acr-only about a dozen
cases. Some of rhese are dependency proceedings, which are difficult to
apply to probate p roceedings.
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A. Initial Child Custody Determination. Initi al custody dispute jurisdiction hinges on the child's and, in part, on the parents' residential sratus.

Parties cannot change or choose jurisdictio n merely by agreement. T hey cannot concede to a specific forum for personal convenience. T he jurisdictional
decisions must consider the best interest of rhe child and location of evidence,•· which does nor always happen.
Srates may hear "initial"" child custody disputes upo n proof of:

• " Home state jurisdiction"'''
1
• Being "a more appropriate forum" "
11
• Presence of''significant connections"~' and available evidence
• An emergency'' that allows temporary jurisdiction);
• Or that no other state with jurisdiction will exercise jurisdiction.

,. 7nylor M. v. Superior Court, I06 Cal. App. 4th 97 (4th Dist. 2003) (C:1Iifornia ruled
that parem s of a child [involved in a depe ndency and ado prio n easel and adopti ve pare nts could not simpl y agree to c hange th e venu e of th e case from Califo rnia w "lcxas because bo th pa rti es th o ught "lcxas adoptio n l aw.~ were mo re
agreeable. The biological parems, adopti ve pare nts, a nd adoption agency agreed
ro allow "lexas to finalize ado ptio n beca use of Californ ia's o ne year reside ncy rcquirem enr. Texas lacked jurisdiction. lr is in the hcst int erest of the child to ad judicate cuswdy where in th e home state where signifi cant connecti o ns a nd
evide nce as to the child's "care, protection, training and pcr~onal relationships"
exi st. further, this scenario docs not establish a need for "ll:xas w assum e cmcr·
gency jurisdiction).
" Cal. Pa m. Code §3402 ('" initial determinatio n' means the first child c ustod y determination concerning a particula r child").
•·• Cal. Fam. Code §3402 ('" ho me state" mea ns the stare in which a child lived with a
parcm or a person acting as a parent for at least six consccut ivc mo nrhs immediatcl)' hefi1rc rhc commenecmcnr of a child cuswdy proceedin g. In the case of a
child lcs_~ than six monrhs of age, the re rm mea ns the SWt(' in which the child lived
from birth wirh any of the perso ns mentioned. A period of temporary absence of
any of the mcnrioncd persons is part of the pe ri od").
... Ca l. Fam. Code §3427.
,, !d. §342 1.
•• !d.

., !tl. §3424.
,, !tl. §342 1.
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California initial jurisdiction case law is straightforward. In rhe case of
In re Claudia 5., The Court of Appeals found that California properly assumed jurisdiction in a domestic violence dependency case where all three
children were born and raised in California and both parents lived in
California until the wife took rhe kids to visit their grandma in Mexico. 1$
"Nothing in the record suggests that [the children] ever lived outside
California before they left to visit their grandmother in Mexico."!(• These
facts are simple. T he court's decision is clear.
Plas v. Superior Court shows further insight on initial determination requirementsY A mother brings her three-year-old son, who has dual citizenship in France and the USA, ro California to visit extended family for the
holidays. Four momhs later, while still in California, the mother files for divorce and requests sole custody of her son. The mother argues significant
connection to and evidence in the scare.
The Superior Court rules that mother and son have "minimal contact''
with California but nor rhe "maximum contacts ... necessary to establisll
jurisdiction." )x Yearly month-long visits co California, extended fami ly
members in the state, and four months in the state prior to the commencement of action did not establish a significant connection to the state. The
judge explains that the significant connection clause "is [meant] to limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it, ... [that] jurisdiction exists only if it
is in the child's interest, ... [and that] the interest of rhe child is served when
!'
.!•·
''
"

In re Claudia S. N al.• 131 Cal. App. 4th 236 (2005) .
!d. at 243.
P!as v. Superior Court I 55 Cal. App. 3d 1008 (I 984).
!tl. ar 1015 (" (Visiting a doctOr, attending school, making friends, etc.! are unexceptional even in rhc conrexr of shon-term prese nce. While there is no question bur
that Gwen's connection with California satisfies almost any notion of"minimum
conracts," rhe Commissioners' Note clearly stares that maximum contacts are necessary to establish jurisdiction. The rrial court ignored rhe EKt that Gwen was born
and raised in France, rhat he lived in France exclusively until shordy hcforc rhc
hearing, and rhar Prance is the only place where rhc parries and Gwen ever lived
wgcrhcr as a fi1mily and is where Gerard has continuously maimained residence.
These are the "substamial" and "significant" connections required hy rhe Act,
which California C<ln claim only hy exaggerating irs minimum comacrs.") See also
B,rcon v. Bflcon, 293 N . W. 2d 819, 821 n. 3 (Mic h. App. 1980).
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the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence about the ch ild and family."-"' France has proper jurisdiction.
Ini tial jurisdiction provisions appear to balance stabiliry and evidence. As
we see in the case of In re Claudirt S. and Plas, a strong motivation for initial
jurisdictional decisions is finding a forum that has the best and most relevant
evidence. This balance must continue throughout the entire jurisdiction
process. The six-month home state clause is nor a provision to allow anyone
to change venues after six months, bur stands as a preventative and protective clause. A six-month minimum keeps parents from forum hopping with
ease bur also allows a change of venue for other cases that may involve abuse
or emergency. T he initial jurisdiction section is a direct improvement of the
conflict that existed prior to and during the UCCJA.
Tempormy Emergency Jurisdiction. "The fi nding of an emergency is to
be made only after an evidentiary hearing."·'" California Fami6' Code
§3424 subdivisions (a) states, "a court of rhis srare has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been
abandoned or iris necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
the child, or a sibling or parent of the ch ild . is subjected to, or threatened
with, mistreatment or abuse. "31 Emergencies are situations where a child is
·'' In rt' Man·i11gt> ofNrwsome ar I (explains rhe extent of signifrcanr connections and evidence. "Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence ro support jurisdiction in California under the signifrcanr connection test. The children had livc:d in Texas for
three years. there had been no visitation with their f.1ther during the three-year period, and the bulk, if not all, of the releva nt information relating to the children
was in -lcxas. Thus, there were maximum, as opposed w minimum, contacts with
the State of'lexas").
'"In rt A. C. 200S p. 8 of II .
" (b) If there is no previous child custody dctermin:uion that is en ci d~d to be enforced
under this part and a child custody proceeding has nor heen commcncl'd in a coun
of a swtc hav ing jurisdiction und er Sections 342 1 to 3423. inclusive, a child custody J ctcnninarion made under this section remains in cfTcct umi l an order is obtained from a cnun of a state having jurisdiction und er Sections 342 1 to 3423.
inclusive. If a child custody proceeding has nor been or is nor commenced in a
coun of a stare having jurisuiction under Seerions 342 1 to 3423. inclusive, a child
custody dcterminarion made under this section becomes a final determinacion, if it
so provide.~ and this stare becomes rhe horne srate of the child.
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in "imminenr danger."'! Simply stated, "Emergencies under the act generally involve sexual or physical abuse."J 1 Hafer v. Superior Court explains
that " harsh" discipline or " insensitivity" is not enough to establish an
emergency.
Here the morher has complcrely hlilcd to describe any emergency condition
warranring her harmful and lawless conduct. If the fatht~r is somewhar harsh,
insensitive, roo quick to discipline, thar is nor imminenr child abuse. His pos·
sible slowness ro diagnose medical problems or provide treatment is not such
neglect as would warranr dcprivarion of cusrody on an emergency basis. We talk
here of allegations of dental neglect, unawareness of early symproms of bladder
infection, possibly some spankings with a "switch'' or hairbrush. This alleged
neglectful and harsh pareming has been going on for more rhan rhrcc years. Is
this tanramounr to an emergency requiring removal of the children to
California for a custodial modification procedure•·

The answer is no. The judge concluded chat these allegations are not enough
to establish an emergency and change venue to California.
Court orders under emergency jurisdiction are temporary. The reasoning behind this is that as soon as a child is safe from abuse or harm there is
no emergency. Jurisdiction returns to the proper state. Temporary orders are
replaced as soon as state courts with p roper jurisdiction issue an order. In the
case of In re C. T (2002) the court clarifies that since emergency jurisdiction
is temporary, a courr that acts u nder this jurisdiction cannot address questions of permanence:" A temporary order will become permanent if no state
takes fu rther action. The state that made the temporary order then becomes
the home state. Emergency jurisdiction is also allowable if it is probable and
reasonable that a horne state or country will not address the issue at hand. "·
" In re joseph D, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 574 ( 1993).
" In reA. C. at 862.
1
' Hnjer v. Superior Court, I 26 Cal. App. 3J 856. 864 (1981).
" In re CT., I 00 Cal. App. 4th I 0 I, I 08 n.l b (2002) (" ... emergency jurisdiction may
be exercised to protect rhe child only on a temporary basis." Once In re C 7: was removed fl'()tn rhe porcnti;~l of sexual abuse by telliporary placeincnt with her mother
umil a more permanent order could be invoked, Arkansas had jurisdiction).
"' !d. at 113 (/11 re C.J: cites In re N1d,1- father in Saudi Arabia gained custody of his
children when his wife came to California. Father divorced wife, who moved ro
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£-;:dmive t1nd Continuing Jurisdiction. The UCCJ EA's exclusive and
continuing jurisdiction clause makes intemare jurisdictional changes, after
initial determinations, difficult. Courts view all subsequent child custody
marrers as continuations of the first action. •· T his section of the UCCJEA
concentrates on stability fo r children involved in order modifications or
multiple custody disputes (i.e., children involved in more than one of the
following: divorce, dependency, welfare, probate). It also protects children
from parents' harmful tactics. Regardless of the possible varying circumstances, the courts recognize that the same child is still involved in a child
custody marrer. If Cali fornia makes initial cusrody determinations or previously exercises emergency jurisdiction , California retai ns jurisdiction if rhe
following is true:
I. The hild has a "significant connection" with California and "sub-

Sl.tlllial evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training,
and personal relationships" is available in the state,
2. The "child, the child 's parents, and any person acting as a parcnr"

live in rhe state, or
3. If the state satisfies the rules of initial jurisdiction.

I<

Califo rnia and father awarded children. Pivc years later rhc fa rh cr hi rs his daughter
while vacarioning in Florida, the mother takes bmh children to California with her,
and rhc daughter discloses to her mother rhar she has bern sexually abused. There
w:1s no evidence that a court in Saudi Arabia would address the problems disclosed
by dw children. T hus emergency jurisdiction was rightfully used).
,. In rr Mnrri11gr nf Krriss I 22 Cal. App. 4th I 082 (2004).
" Cal. Fam. Code §3422 (a) Except as orhcrwist' prnvided in Section 3424, a court of this
state rh ar has made a child custody determination consistem with Section 342 I or
3423 has exclusive, conrinuing jurisdiction over the determination until either of the
fi1ll0wing occurs: ( I) A court of this stare dcrcrmincs rh<H neither the child, nor rhe
child and on(· parenr, nor the child and a person acring as a parenr have a ~ignifica nr
connecrion wirh rhis srare and that subsranria l evidence is no longer available in rhis
state concerning rhe child's care.:. protection, rraining. and personal rc.:brionships. (2)
A court of this stare or a court of another srarc determines rhat thl' child. rhc child's

parents, and any person acting as a parent do nor presently reside in rhis state. (3) A
court of this state that has made a child custody determination and docs nor have cxclu,ivc, co nrinuing jurisdiction under this section may modifY thar determination
only if it has jurisdiction w make an initial dcl<'rminarion under Section 342 1.
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In rhe case o f In reMarriage of Kreiss, a divorced father with sole custody asked the court to require someone co accompany his former wife and
child on a vacation to another srate. He was concerned about his form er
wife's mental state. Her health had been an issue in the initial custody order.
The court acted as though the custody case of one year ago was not closed.
Part of the court's rationale for retaining jurisdiction is char the parents and
chjJd had remained in Californ ia since the last action in the child custody
case.
Gmham v Superior Court applied similar rationale. A mother, granted
p hysical cusrody of her rwin toddlers by stipulation in divorce proceedings,
moved to New York. Four months later, she attempted w open a new custody case in New York and modify custody. New York stayed proceedings fo r
lack of jurisdiction. California ruled that exclusive and continuing jurisdiction exists in California as long as the child o r a parent with visiration rights
remains in California after Cali fornia's initial determinacion:"
Both of these cases are di vorce cases based on stipulations. The latest
custody orders were granted no more than a year earlier. Boch cases involve
modifications between biological paren ts with some cusrody or visiracion
rights.
Courts consider exclusive and continuing jurisdiction co be in the bcsr
interest of the child. Some reasons may be that retaining jurisdiction maintains stabil ity, p revents parental tactics of m aking another state the child's
home state six months after the last custody o rder in order to try their luck
in from of a new judge, and expedites modification actions.
Tho ugh it can be difficult to change jurisdiction after an initial determination, it is possible·•" because there are exceptions. California Family Code
§3427 states that jurisd iction may be altered if a scace has jurisdiction , but it
is nor a con venient forum. Here are the major factO rs considered by a court
reviewing conven ience:
., Gmhnm v. Suptrior Court ofCnl.. t'f nL, 92 S. C r. 1265 (2005 Cal. App. 2005).
""' Cal. hm. Code §3423 (modification of anor hcr srare's orders is allowable if California
meers rhc inirial jurisdicrional rcquirerncms anJ rhc srare rhar previously JcciJcJ a
cusrody mancr rule-s rhar ir does nor have "exclusive and conrinuing jurisdicrion,"
California is "more convcnienr," or no one involved in the custody dispute srill resides in rh c orher srarc).
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• Any "domestic violence"
• Amount of rime the child has been absent from the state
• Geographical location of the courrs in question
• Ability of rhe parties
forum

to

monetarily support the adjudication in either

• Consensus of both parries on a f(Hum stare
• "Natu re and location of rhe evidence ... including testimony of the
child"
• Possibility of a speedy resolution and rhc method necessary to do so
• And the courts knowledge of the case facts:''
In Taylor M v. Superior Court California retains jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding even though both parries agreed to Texas jurisdicrion.41 It is
in rhe best interest of the Canadian adoptive parents ro move the adoption
proceedings to Texas because California requires one-year residency prior to
adoption. The court's first priority is the best interest of the child. The child
was involved in dependency proceedings and Texas had no evidence about
the child.
In Schlumf v. Superior Court the court of appeals determines that
Wyoming is a more appropriate forum ro contest custody because the father
with sole custody of nine years and his children lived in Wyoming for five
years prior ro this dispute:'J Though the mother remained in California,
\Xfyorning offered a more significant connection and better evidence. The
judge considers transferring jurisdiction, for reasons of evidence and stability for the chi ldren, in the best interest of rhe children.

VII. Holbrook Argument
After thorough research of UCCJEA and case law, the Superior Court
judge nor only misinterprets the act and case law for the HoLbrook case, but
the judge also exposes a serious problem wirh the exclusive and conrinuing
jurisdiction section of rhe UCCJEA. Both of these revolve around insufficien t evidence.
·• Cal. Fam. Code §3427.
•· 7it)dor M. v. Superior Corm, I 06 Cal. App. 4th (4th Dist., 2003).
'' Schlumf v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 3d 892 ( 1978).
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T he present Holbrook case is nor a marrer of initial cusrody jurisdiction because of the former divorce and California custody order. It could arguably fi1ll
within either emergency jurisdiction or exclusive and continuing jurisdiction.
Emergency jurisdiction is straightforward and founded by evidence. Exclusive
and continuing jurisdiction lacks a foundation in evidence and instead prizes
stabiliry for the child.
Emergency Jurisdiction. First, we will review emergency jurisdiction. As
stated above, emergency jurisdiction typica lly means abuse or " imminent
danger." lr is also temporary. As stated in C. T. (2002), judges acting under
emergency jurisdiction cannot add ress issues of permanence.
The allegations that Benjam in washes Tyler's mouth out with soap, yells
ar Tyler, has slap ped Tyler on the face, an d makes poor decisions are weak.
These allegations are similar to the insufficient allegations in Sch/umf v.
Superior Court. Even if Benjamin concedes ro these allegations, to rule that
this establishes an emergency is a stretch.
The o ne ircm rhat could reasonably make this an emergency jurisdictio n
situation would be verification of corrobo rating information of abuse
within rhe police report in Urah of domestic violence. However, in formation about this event is in Utah, there is o n ly one report alleged, and the
existence of a repo rt does not mandate that there was abuse (the police report makes claims of only a verbal argument). Simply stating thar
Benjamin is abusive does nor establish emergency jurisdiction. The
Superior Court judge did nor have rhe po lice report when he ruled to
renew the expired temporary guardianship order. There should have been
proper evidence ... evidence of Benjamin and Tyler's relationship is in
Utah. Tyler's aunr and uncle are nor eyewitnesses ro any of the allegations
of abuse. In order to justify his ruling, the judge had to consider this silllarion an emergency.
A determination rhat the scenario evokes an emergency does nor allow
California ro keep jurisdiction. There must be other grounds for jurisdiction.
As soon as the judge makes his order, no emergency exisrs and Califo rnia's
tempo rary jurisdiction ends. Further determinations in rhis case involve q uestions of permanence. Borh Benjamin's fitness as a parent and whether Tyler's
aunc and uncle should be permanent guardians are issues of permanence.
Only the court with proper jurisdiction can address these questions. In this
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situation, the court would need jurisdiction as it falls under the exclusive and
continuing jurisdiction requirements.
Exclusive & Continuing jurisdiction. California al ready had jurisdiction
for an initial custody determination. Therefore, the section of the UCCJEA
that could grant California jurisdiction at present is the exclusive and continuing jurisdicrion section. Exclusive and continuing jurisdicrion ex ists if
the case scenario can sarisfy any of rhe fol lowing quesrions:
• Docs Tyler have a "significanr connection" wirh California and is
there "subsranrial evidence" concerning !Tyler's) protection. training. and personal relarionships in California?
• Docs Tyler. his parents, or "any person acting as a parem," live in
California?
• Docs California satisfy the rules of inirial jurisdiction?''
• Is California a forum of convenience?
This is where the forum is questionable. California partially satisfies some of
these questions.
Addressing rhe first point, one may argue thar Tyler has a signi fi cant
connection ro the srate (either referenci ng Tyler's mother, who moved back
a few months ago or referring to his aunt and uncle whom he visits yearly
and presently resides with) ; however, there is very little evidence in
Cal ifornia about his "care, protection, rraining, and personal relarionships."4~ Ar the commencement of this action, Tyler had been in California
for three weeks. The last six to seven years worth of evidence regarding
Tyler, Benjamin, and Tyler's mom is in Utah. Urah has most if nor all of the
evidence aboU£ Tyler's schooling, fri endships, relationship with his father,
medical records, ere., for the last seven years of his life. With this information, a judge could determine and uphold Tyler's best interests. Comparing
these two periods shows a large evidentiary discrepancy. Exclusive and continuing jurisdiction cases must meet both significant con nections and suffi cient evidence guidelines. Utah clearly better fulfills both of these
requirements.
" C.1l. l~1 m . Code §.3422.
•' Cal. ram. C<>dc §3421 .
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Tyler's situation technically satisfies the next question about the residence of an acting parenr in California. Both Tyler's mom and his temporary guardians live in Californ ia. However, Tyler's mom is not a parry to this
action as she lived in Urah for the six previous years, and technically Utah
is still her home state because she has only been in California for four
months. Tyler's aunt and uncle dearly have home state status in California,
bur rhey have been Tyler's temporary guardians for only a few weeks.
Though likely, it is unclear if three weeks of living in California and a new,
temporary guardianship order are suftlcient ro give the aunr and uncle
parental status. Strict interpretation of California Family Code §3402 shows
rhar the presenr arrangement might suffice."'
California does not satisfy the third requirement, the rules of initial jurisdiction . Three sets of conditions establish initial jurisdiction. California fai ls
ro meet the requirement because of any or all of the following. Firsr,
California is nor Tyler's home state. Second, California fails to satisfy all
three of the following items:
• Technically, Utah has home srate jurisdiction and has nor declined
to acr upon ir. Utah did nor wave initi<ll jurisdiction rights to
Califi>rnia by findings of emergency jurisdiction or more appropriate forum.
• Tyler may have a connection ro California other than physical presence, but it is nor significant. (Review rhc situation of f>!as v.
Superior Court, initial jurisdiction does nor seem plausible.
California has minimum conracrs. Ye-arly momh-long visits, a biological parent in the state who commenced action, and f(Hlr
months of living in California were not enough.)
• California has little.:, if any, c.:videncc.: about Tyler's "care, protc.:ction,
training, and personal relationships."·•' Though there may be some

••· Cal. Fam. Code §3402 stares rhar a "'Person acting as a parent' means a pe rson, other
th<m a parcm, who (I) has physical cusrody of the child or has had physical cusrody for a period of six consecmive rnonrhs, including any temporary absence
within one year immedi:ltcly hefin·e rhe commencement of a child custody proceeding: and (2) has been awan.lcd legal custody by a court or claims a right to
legal custody under the laws of this stare."
.- Cal. Fam. Code §3421.
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evidence in rhe state, most of rhc relevam intormation to this dis·
pure is in Utah. Seven years of evidence in Urah a.~ opposed to
three weeks in California is a large discrepancy. Though California
may be able to obtain acccs.~ ro much of the evidence in Urah, this
section requires a measuremem of evidence prcscnrly in California.
The last question under the exclusive and conrinuing section asks if
California is a forum of convenience. It is nor. As me ntioned previously in chis
article, this section of the UCCJ EA lists eight specific facwrs that need to be
addressed. T he answers to these ques tions for the Holbrook case are as follows:
• At pro;em, there is no finding of domestic violence--evidenced in Utah.
• Tyler has been absent fro m Califi)rnia for seven years.
• The courts arc approximately sixteen hours, by car, apart. This dis·
tancc will greatly inc rease the cost of adjudication for the traveling pany.
• Benjamin is an elementary school reacher working in a public
school. He is our of debt and finishes paying hills and necessities
of life with about two hundred dollars left each mo nth, whereas
Tykr's aunr and uncl e have rhc combined salaries of a real estate
agent and a specialized doctor. T hey arc out of debe own a large
house in California, have hundreds of tho usands of dollars in sav·
ings and investments, and have thousands of dollars left w spend
each month after paying bills and neccs.~ities of life. This custody
battle would have little impact on the aunt and uncle's finances.
Benja min would incur significant debt.
• Neither party agrees
decision.

to

which state should ad judicacc the custody

• The majority of evidence about Tyler, Benjamin , and Tyler's mom
(including his "care, prmcction, training, and personal relationships") is in Utah. Only information about rhc aunt and uncle as
well as Tyler's testimony is in California.
• The re is no reason why either state could not expeditiously resolve
this marter. (However, there is a possibility that Utah could move
quicker because it is the location of s ignificam evidence.)
• California has records of the prior decree of divorce and custody
papers.
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According ro these eight items, California is <1 forum of convenience for
the aunr and uncle. It is not convenient for Tyler or Benjamin. Adjudicating
this case, with added costs for travel to California (including atrorney fees,
witnesses, tangible evidence), is extremely difficult for Benjamin.
Cali fornia may be able to establish exclusive and conrinuing jurisdiction.
This section provides four distinct ways to retain jurisdiction that we discussed. However, f do not think that they meet all of the necessary requirements to establish it and even if they presently do, they should not exercise it
because of the lack of evidence. Three weeks versus seven years is quire a large
difference.
Exclusive and cominuing jurisdiction case law, most recently Kreiss•• and
Gmham,•• differs significantly from rhe Holbrook scenario; according ro the
parries involved in the actions, rhe time between cusrody orders, and continued residency in California. The Holbrook scenario does nor involve two biological parents who are entitled to child custody or visitation. Tyler's aunt and
uncle have standing only because of the temporary guardianship order. This
scenario is not a modification of four months or one year. Seven years passed
since the lase custody order, during which rime neither Tyler, Tyler's mother,
or Benjamin continued to reside in California.
The circumstances of Graham and Kreiss are drasrically different. Both
cases find that a state retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction if one parent with visitation rights lives in that state. This legal interpretation also does
not fir the Holbrook case. In both Kreiss and Graham, a biological parent
(parry to the inirial custody order) continued to live in California. The most
important point in Kreiss and Gmham is that sign ificant evidence (from rhe
time rhe actions commenced) remained in California. It was reasonable for
California ro retain both cases according ro the continu ing and exclusive jurisdiction clause because the courts rightfully had authority and evidence to
make findings. Ir was not reasonable for the California judge to retain jurisdiction in the Holbrook case.
Presently under the UCCJEA it is legal, however unethical, to allow a
scare to ·retain jurisdiction if there is insufficient evidence in the stare or
•• In re Mnrringe ofKreiss, 122 Cal. App. 4rh I 082 (2004).
•·· G'mllt11n v. Superior Court ofCnl.. et,rL, 92 S. Cr. 1265 (2005 Cal. App. 2005).
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when anorher stare is more appropriate by measurement of evidence. T he
judge in the Holbrook case made two judgments of error: that emergency jurisdiction existed and that California should retain jurisdiction when the
necessary and majority of evidence was in Utah.
VU. Future Directions of the UCCJEA:
The Holbrook case exposes problems with the exclusive and continuing
section of the UCCJEA. One problem is that rhe section incorporates so
many reasons why a court can and should retain jurisdiction that the section
makes it appear that jurisdiction should continue in the same state of initial
jurisdiction even if another forum is better or provides the best and necessary evidence.
This section of the act also fails to provide indications of which of its provisions is most or more important. lr holds each provision equally important.
For example, significant connection and substantial evidence is one provision whereas the mere presence of the child and a parent or a persona acting
as 3 parenr in the stare is another ground for retaining jurisdiction. If a judge
determines solely chat a ch ild and a parenr are in rhe state, he can keep jurisd iction. Th is completely ignores evidence. T he exclusive and continuing
section of the UCCJEA needs to be better defined.
T he wriring of the exclusive and conrinuing jurisdiction within the
UCCJEA should be clarified to specify the proper balance of the provisions
therein. T he differenr sections of the UCCJEA are meant to increase the
availabi li ty of evidence, not detract from it. Clarifications to the act must
stern from a realization char evidence is nor only in the best interest of the
child bur is also the only means whereby a judge can make consistent and
accurate determinations in our scienrifically based legal system.
Vlll. Conclusion:
T he UCCJEA is based on good principles. lr is an improvement from the
UCCJA. lr addresses many problems rhar used co vex judges, parents, and
children involved in interstate child cuscody disputes. However, the act is nor
a perfect improvement. The act has a weakness when it comes to exclusive
and continuing jurisdicrion. The UCCJEA does not emphasize J ererrnining
jurisdiction according to availability of evidence. This is evident in cases like
the Holbrook case. lr is roo difficult to change venue after an initial cusrody
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proceeding is determined within California even if rhere is insufficient evidence for a judge to determ ine and uphold the best interest of the child.
California should nor keep a court case under irs jurisdiction if another forum
is more appropriate regardless of a significant connection to the scare. The
UCCJEA must be revised to give srronger emphasis ro evidence and provide
berrer guidelines for determining rhe relative importance and weight by
which provisions within the act should be measured. Such minor changes to
the act could help people like Tyler and Benjamin Holbrook enormously in
future cases.

